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pecially in light of increased cooperation in criminal matters. 
Both the introduction of the area of freedom, security and jus-
tice and the principle of mutual recognition have contributed 
to this heightened awareness.
First, the 1998 Commission communication on the area of 
freedom, security and justice voiced a general feeling: EU 
action to establish minimum standards to protect individual 
rights in criminal proceedings was deemed necessary to coun-
terbalance judicial cooperation measures that significantly 
enhanced the powers of prosecutors, courts, and investigative 
officers.1 Only the establishment of such minimum standards 
would be able to neutralise the negative effects of having mul-
tiple Member States involved in investigative and prosecuto-
rial acts.
Second, the importance of a debate on procedural rights was 
intensified following the 1999 Tampere conclusions, in which 
it was established that mutual recognition would be the cor-
nerstone of judicial cooperation in the EU.2 Recognising the 
possible impact of mutual recognition on procedural rights, 
the 2000 Programme of Measures stated the following: “It 
must be ensured that the treatment of suspects and the rights 
of the defence would not suffer from the implementation of the 
principle of mutual recognition.”3 Furthermore, it stated that 
procedural rights “should not only not suffer from the imple-
mentation of the principle of mutual recognition but also that 
the rights would even be improved through the process”. This 
baseline is key to our line of argumentation.
The impact of the last clause of the baseline can easily be mis-
interpreted. It should be emphasised that the improvement of 
procedural rights in pure domestic situations can never be a 
goal in itself.4 The EU has neither the intention nor the com-
petence to interfere with domestic regulations. The scope of 
EU legislative intervention is limited to ensuring a high level 
of procedural rights in cross-border situations. Only in such 
cross-border situations, where procedural rights cannot other-
wise be guaranteed, is EU intervention justified. 
Therefore the EU’s objective is to develop common minimum 
standards and a set of best practices that can ensure a high 
The establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice 
has undeniably led to an increase in people becoming involved 
not only in criminal proceedings in a Member State other than 
that of their residence, but, even moreso, in criminal pro-
ceedings that involve investigative and/or prosecutorial acts 
in multiple Member States. These so-called “multi-Member 
State criminal proceedings” have sparked awareness of the 
need to take measures to ensure adequate procedural rights in 
such situations. Without a doubt, criminal proceedings spread 
over multiple Member States run the risk of jeopardizing those 
procedural rights. It explains the origin of the current proce-
dural rights debate in the European Union.
With this contribution, the authors wish to present a threefold 
critique related to the boundaries of the current procedural 
rights debate:
 First, paradoxically, the current procedural rights debate 
has, to a large extent, lost the link with cross-border situations 
and multi-Member State criminal proceedings;
 Second, there is an apparent over-focus on “traditional fair 
trial rights,” whereas the most important focus should be on 
the rights during the pre-trial investigative stage;
 Third, there is a clear inconsistency between the expecta-
tions and requirements EU Member States have with respect 
to other EU Member States compared to non-EU Member 
States.
Before discussing this threefold critique, the main develop-
ments leading up to the current debate will be reviewed to the 
extent deemed necessary to follow our line of argumentation.
I.  The Current Procedural Rights Debate
The establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice 
constitutes an important turning point for the status of proce-
dural rights in European criminal policy making. Even though 
all 27 Member States are party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereafter ECHR), many scholars and policy 
makers considered it problematic that the European Union it-
self had no binding texts on the protection of human rights in 
criminal proceedings. This lacunae had gained attention, es-
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level of procedural rights with respect to multi-Member State 
criminal proceedings. 
The following two clarifications make clear that this develop-
ment of minimum standards should not be interpreted as a race 
to the bottom. Firstly, it is not desirable that minimum stand-
ards are limited to the smallest common denominator in pro-
cedural rights. On the contrary, it might very well be that sev-
eral Member States change their national legislation in light of 
agreed minimum standards. Secondly, there is no need to fear 
that common standards will lead to a lowering of standards, as 
Member States remain free to implement the highest level of 
rights they consider appropriate as long as they comply with 
the agreed minimum. Therefore, it is correct to argue that the 
entire process of accommodating the problems of cross-bor-
der cooperation will lead to the improvement of rights, even 
though such improvement in a mere domestic situation is not 
a goal in itself.
This balanced interpretation of the improvement of procedural 
rights explains our mixed feelings with respect to the formu-
lation of the goals in the 2003 Commission Green Paper on 
“Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Crimi-
nal Proceedings throughout the European Union.”5 The Green 
Paper states that European citizens and residents can reason-
ably expect to encounter equivalent standards in respect of 
procedural rights throughout the EU, regardless of any cross-
border aspect. In doing so, it loses the link with cross-border 
multi-Member State criminal proceedings and thus exceeds 
the scope of justified EU intervention. Furthermore, the Green 
Paper presents a very narrow interpretation of what procedural 
safeguards are, clearly inspired by and limited to the rights 
listed in Article 6 ECHR.
Considering this focus on ECHR, it comes as no surprise that 
the 2004 proposal for a Framework Decision on procedural 
rights translated this narrow interpretation into a focus on 
traditional fair trial rights, such as the right to legal advice, 
the right to interpretation, and the right to communication. As 
some Member States were not convinced of the added value 
of this proposal in relation to the ECHR, the proposal was not 
adopted.6 Recently, the discussion on procedural rights flared 
up again. In spite of the critique on the lack of added value, the 
focus on ECHR has not changed. The current 2009 Roadmap 
for strengthening the procedural rights of suspected and ac-
cused persons in criminal proceedings calls for the adoption of 
five measures in a step-by-step approach.7 The focus is once 
more on very traditional fair trial rights, fully in line with the 
failed 2004 proposed Framework Decision. 
The boundaries of the current procedural rights debate are 
elaborated on in the following threefold critique.
II.  A Threefold Critique
1.  Losing the Link with Cross-Border Situations
The first critique is centred around the observation that the 
current procedural rights debate has lost the link with cross-
border situations.
As explained in the opening paragraphs, cross-border situa-
tions that involve multiple Member States in investigative and 
prosecutorial acts give reason to start the procedural rights de-
bate and reflect on the necessity for EU intervention. The base-
line for the debate is that the level of procedural rights should 
not be affected by whether or not multiple Member States are 
involved. Any debate on the necessity for EU intervention 
should be viewed from an EU perspective, which means that 
only problems arising from cross-border and multi-Member 
State criminal proceedings should be discussed.
The direction taken with the 2009 Roadmap on procedural 
rights, as the sequel to the failed 2004 proposed Framework 
Decision, has clearly lost the link with cross-border situations. 
The Roadmap calls for strengthening a list of traditional fair 
trial rights, such as the right to translation and interpretation, 
the right to information on the charges, and the right to legal 
aid and advice. Even though we do not intend to minimise the 
importance of these rights, we consider the structure of this 
Roadmap “a bridge too far” in that it insufficiently clarifies 
why these rights are the most important concerns in cross-bor-
der multi-Member State criminal proceedings. The strengthen-
ing of these rights is first and foremost inspired by pragmatic 
and ideological concerns aimed at establishing an area of free-
dom, security and justice in which European citizens and resi-
dents can reasonably expect to encounter equivalent standards 
of procedural rights throughout the EU. This is, however, be-
yond the scope of justified EU intervention to facilitate cross-
border judicial cooperation and is incompatible with the state-
ment that the diversity between the Member States’ criminal 
justice systems should be respected unless differences hinder 
cross-border judicial cooperation.
Even if the measures listed in the Roadmap were to be limited 
and warrant justification in light of cross-border and multi-
Member State criminal proceedings, the authors’ concern 
remains that the interpretation of the concept of “procedural 
rights” is too narrow.
2.  Too Narrow Interpretation of Procedural Rights
The second critique relates to the scope of the current proce-
dural rights debate. There is a lot more to procedural rights 
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than the traditional fair trial rights that dominate the current 
debate.
We strongly believe that the criminal justice system in its en-
tirety is one big cluster of procedural rights, in which tradition-
al fair trial rights represent only a small fraction. The criminal 
procedure should not be limited to the trial phase in front of a 
judge. Procedural rights incompatibilities are far more signifi-
cant when pre-trial evidence gathering is spread over multiple 
Member States.
Even though it should be commended that the 2003 Green 
Paper argued that a discussion of the right to have evidence 
handled fairly was equally important,8 it is regrettable that 
no clear link was made to specific evidence gathering tech-
niques and even more regrettable that the issue was shelved 
indefinitely. Separating the debates on procedural rights and 
evidence gathering is a lost opportunity to look at evidence 
gathering techniques from a procedural rights perspective as 
opposed to an effective prosecution perspective. Two new ele-
ments should be introduced to the procedural rights debate:
 Firstly, the feasibility of establishing minimum standards 
beyond traditional fair trial rights;
 Secondly, the feasibility of lex mitior discussions and “best 
of both world” scenarios.
Firstly, from the argumentation above, it is clear that mini-
mum standards are needed that go beyond traditional fair trial 
rights. The feasibility thereof should be scrutinised for each 
domain of judicial cooperation. For example, in a mutual legal 
assistance context, minimum standards could be established 
for a series of investigative techniques. The introduction of 
such minimum standards would support the further roll out of 
mutual recognition for evidence gathering. Even though the 
adoption of these kinds of minimum standards is, to a certain 
extent, subject to debate in the context of the European In-
vestigation Order, it should be stressed that the focus of this 
debate is on an effective prosecution and ensuring the admissi-
bility of evidence. The debate would additionally benefit from 
a procedural rights perspective.
Similarly, the possibility of introducing minimum procedural 
rights standards should be scrutinised, e.g., in the context of 
pre-trial supervision and extradition as well as in the context 
of transfer of proceedings or execution.
Furthermore the adoption of these kinds of minimum standards 
could also contribute to a more transparent and strict interpre-
tation of the mutual recognition principle. The current instru-
mentarium is anything but transparent and does not adhere to 
a strict interpretation of the mutual recognition principle. Such 
a strict interpretation has implications for the positions of both 
the issuing and the executing Member States: the executing 
Member State is to accept the validity of a decision if taken 
in accordance with the law of the issuing Member State; and 
the issuing Member State is to accept the execution of its deci-
sion if executed in accordance with the law of the executing 
Member State. 
However, the current instrumentarium often deviates from 
a strict interpretation of the mutual recognition principle. At 
times, it is possible for the issuing Member State to request 
that the executing Member State take certain procedural re-
quirements into account, to the extent that these requirements 
do not violate the fundamental principles of the law of the ex-
ecuting Member State. The possibility to request formalities to 
be taken into account is incompatible with a strict interpreta-
tion of mutual recognition. Analysis in previous studies has 
revealed that the adoption of minimum standards with respect 
to procedural rights for certain investigative techniques would 
significantly reduce the perceived need for Member States to 
request formalities. It thus has the potential to bring logic and 
transparency back to the interpretation of the mutual recogni-
tion principle.9
It should, however, be recognised that the suggested minimum 
standards also have their limits. The adoption of minimum 
standards can never do away with all problems arising from 
the differences in criminal justice systems. Furthermore, mini-
mum standards will not harmonise the criminal justice sys-
tems, as Member States will always be allowed to maintain a 
higher level of procedural safeguards.10
Therefore, secondly, an in-depth debate is necessary to assess 
the possibility of introducing a binding lex mitior principle 
into cooperation. Problems and differences will remain, which 
is why looking into the lex mitior principle is recommended. 
Such a principle would ensure that the persons involved can 
always enjoy the best of both worlds, meaning that questions 
of applicable law will be resolved based on what is best for 
the persons involved. The application of a lex mitior principle 
is the only way in which Member States can uphold the base-
line set in the 2000 Programme of Measures, namely that the 
involvement of multiple Member States in a criminal proceed-
ing may never negatively impact the procedural rights of the 
persons involved. Previous research has shown that Member 
States are open for a such debate on the potential of a lex mi­
tior principle.11 The following examples illustrate what a lex 
mitior principle would mean in concrete situations.
Some instruments already imply a lex mitior principle. In cas-
es where transfer of the execution relates to a sanction involv-
ing deprivation of liberty, the executing Member State has the 
right to adapt the nature or duration of a sanction if it is incom-
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patible with its own criminal justice system. The possibility 
of adapting the sanction is limited by the stipulation that such 
an adaptation may never aggravate the sentence passed in the 
issuing state in terms of its nature or duration.12
More interestingly, for the procedural rights debate, questions 
also arise as to the applicable early release regime. It is unclear 
whether the regime of the sentencing Member State should ap-
ply or whether early release possibilities are solely governed 
by the regime of the executing Member State. Despite the gen-
eral rule that execution is governed by the law of the execut-
ing Member State, there is much to recommend in entitling 
the person concerned to claim application of the early release 
regime in the sentencing state if that regime is more benefi-
cial. In addition, not only is the regime in the sentencing state 
taken into account by the sentencing judge when deliberating 
on the duration of the sanction, but the baseline agreed in the 
2000 Programme of Measures clearly states that involvement 
of multiple Member States may never negatively impact the 
rights of the persons involved. The introduction of a lex mi­
tior principle would provide an answer to these questions of 
which law is applicable. Even though, in practice, it will be 
extremely difficult to determine how early release conditions 
would have influenced the execution of a sentence if a person 
has served his sentence in another Member State, it is a viable 
point for discussion.
The complexity of applying the lex mitior principle is even 
clearer in the context of pre-trial supervision measures.13 At 
first glance, application of a lex mitior principle would mean 
that an executing Member State cannot impose supervision 
measures for a longer period than that allowed by its own na-
tional law, even if the issuing Member State requests a longer 
period of supervision. However, it is questionable whether 
such a limitation would indeed amount to a true lex mitior. 
After all, a shorter period of pre-trial supervision in the execut-
ing Member State would most likely trigger an earlier use of 
a surrender request by the issuing Member State. Interpreting 
the lex mitior principle in such a way leads to the perverse 
effect of people being surrendered sooner than if the execut-
ing Member State would have imposed pre-trial supervision 
measures for the period requested by the issuing Member State 
− regardless of the limitations in its own national law. This 
example illustrates that analysis of the potential of a lex mitior 
principle should include the net effect of its application and 
should be exercised with the greatest caution.
In sum, for the reasons elaborated above, the current proce-
dural rights debate is considered to be a bridge that does not 
extend far enough. The tunnel vision caused by the focus on 
traditional “Article 6 ECHR”-like fair trial rights has led to a 
debate that neglects the impact differences in pre-trial proce-
dures have for procedural rights. The scope of minimum stand-
ards should be extended, and a feasibility study is needed to as-
sess the potential of the introduction of a lex mitior principle.
3.  Inconsistent Expectations and Requirements
The third and final critique reveals an inconsistency in expec-
tations and requirements with respect to procedural rights. EU 
Member States are more demanding towards other EU Mem-
ber States, compared to the demands with respect to non-EU 
Member States, even though cooperation has the same con-
sequences for the persons involved. It should be underlined 
that differences in expectations and requirements with respect 
to procedural rights are only justified to the extent that coop-
eration between EU Member States is more far-reaching than 
cooperation with non-EU Member States. This constitutes an 
important limit for the procedural rights debate. The current 
distortion gives way to more distrust and reticence in relations 
between EU Member States when compared to relations with 
non-EU Member States. This situation is clearly incompatible 
with the EU’s objective to evolve towards facilitating coopera-
tion based on more trust and respect for each other’s criminal 
justice systems.
The adoption of the European Arrest Warrant (hereafter EAW) 
has been the irrefutable catalyst. Even though the transition 
from the former extradition-scene to the current surrender-
scene did not negatively impact the rights of the persons in-
volved – in that the consequences of cooperation remained 
the same – the adoption of the EAW was used to launch the 
debate on ensuring procedural rights. Strangely enough, situa-
tions that had never provoked debate in the past were suddenly 
considered highly problematic in an EAW context. Suddenly, 
a surrender to Poland creates more suspicion than an extradi-
tion to Azerbaijan: Even though we welcome the general in-
creased attention paid to procedural rights, it is inacceptable to 
increase the expectations and requirements in EAW surrender 
cases between EU Member States, if no parallel increase is 
introduced in extradition to non-EU Member States.
Of course, we agree that EU citizens may expect their EU 
Member States to maintain a high level of procedural rights 
in relation to other states. However, this policy should not be 
dependent on the states involved. If EU policy requires a cer-
tain level of procedural rights to be maintained, this EU policy 
should stand in relation to other EU Member States no more 
and no less than it should stand in relation to non-EU Member 
States. It is inconsistent to have a different set of procedural 
rights requirements in relation to EU and non-EU Member 
States if the nature and consequences of the cooperation are 
the same.
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Therefore, the current course of the procedural rights debate 
is either a bridge too far or a bridge not far enough. It is a 
bridge too far in that Member States are to limit expectations 
and requirements with respect to procedural rights in mere EU 
multi-Member State situations to the level maintained in rela-
tion to non-EU Member States. It is a bridge not far enough 
in that Member States should also increase expectations and 
requirements in relation to non-EU Member States.
III.  Conclusion
The current procedural rights debate is clearly heading in the 
wrong direction. Not only is the debate often off-topic in that it 
has lost the link with cross-border multi-Member State crimi-
nal proceedings, but the subject of the debate is also too nar-
row and inconsistent in light of relations with non-EU Member 
States. Adjustments are needed to get the debate back on track.
The procedural rights debate would benefit from a broad in-
terpretation of the concept of procedural rights, reflecting the 
entirety of the criminal justice procedure to assess the impact 
of multi-Member State criminal proceedings and the necessity 
of introducing minimum standards as flanking measures for 
the functioning of mutual recognition. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to find a way to ensure that the involvement of multiple 
Member States never compromises the position of the persons 
involved. It is most encouraging that Member States have ex-
pressed their willingness to assess the feasibility of introducing 
a lex mitior principle. This may well be a straightforward solu-
tion to cases involving conflicting systems of procedural rights.
A proper balance should be struck between individual debates 
on procedural rights and integrated debates combining both 
procedural rights and specific cooperation mechanisms. The 
current debate on the European Investigation Order would 
benefit from a stronger procedural rights perspective.
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